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The prospect of open 
deliberations in the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court
Recent episodes have underscored a lack of collegiality 
among the justices on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 
including most prominently an alleged assault of one 
justice by another. In response, Chief Justice Shirley 
Abrahamson proposed a menu of institutional reforms 
for her colleagues’ consideration, with the stated goal 
of enhancing collegiality. She expressly called on each 
justice’s commitment “to promoting civility and safety 
in our workplace; to maintaining personal control in 
our language, demeanor, temperament, and conduct 
on and off the bench; to bolstering the public trust and 
confidence in the Court and our judicial system; and 
to upholding the Court’s long-standing reputation for 
excellence.”
The chief justice’s proposals included the issuance of 
a joint statement pledging greater efforts toward colle-
giality, the hiring of experts on conflict resolution and 
small group dynamics, and a number of modifications to 
the standards and mechanisms related to recusals. But 
the one that received the most attention was her sugges-
tion that the court open its deliberations to the public.
There are, of course, many ways in which a court 
might make its deliberations open, and Chief Justice 
Abrahamson presented a number of options, including 
holding the court’s deliberations in a room open to the 
public, holding the deliberations in a closed room but 
streaming live video, or recording the court’s delibera-
tions for later release. As most observers expected, the 
other justices rejected these proposals. Justice David 
Prosser suggested that open deliberations would “stifle 
candor.” In similar fashion, Justice N. Patrick Crooks 
alluded to the clichéd parallel between the making of 
law and sausage.
While open deliberation will not become a reality 
at the court, Chief Justice Abrahamson’s proposal 
prompts deeper consideration of precisely why closed 
judicial deliberation is the uniform practice in American 
appellate courts. After all, courts in some countries do 
deliberate in public. The Supreme Court of Brazil, for 
example, holds its deliberations in public and on live 
television, and publishes transcripts of the deliberations 
together with its rulings. (The court also has its own 
Twitter feed and YouTube channel.) Closer to home, at 
least in terms of our systemic heritage, English courts 
have long operated according to a tradition of orality in 
which every step of the adjudicative process takes place 
in public. The underlying idea, according to Professor 
Robert Martineau, is that “[t]he faithful observance of 
the tradition … guarantees the accountability of English 
justice and maintains public confidence in it.”
The sense that open deliberations would be problem-
atic seems to rest primarily on the understanding that 
there is something valuable about secret deliberations 
that would be lost if the process were opened. The fear 
is that justices—perhaps especially those in an elec-
tive system—would be wary of articulating positions, 
even tentatively, that might be used against them in a 
later campaign. While egregious acts of non-collegiality 
would undoubtedly be deterred, collegiality in a deeper 
sense might suffer. Whatever legitimate exchanges of 
ideas take place among the justices would be pushed 
underground, and would not occur among the whole 
court.
We might reasonably be skeptical about this reaction, 
however, given that the available evidence suggests that 
judicial deliberation is rarely meaningful, even on courts 
that do not suffer from the collegiality issues currently 
present on the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Biographies 
of U.S. Supreme Court justices, for example, consis-
tently relate new justices’ disappointment at what takes 
place (or, more accurately, does not) in the conference 
room. Judge Posner makes the point more forcefully 
in the early pages of How Judges Think: “The difficulty 
outsiders have in understanding judicial behavior is due 
partly to the fact that judges deliberate in secret, though 
it would be more accurate to say that the fact that they 
do not deliberate (by which I mean deliberate collec-
tively) very much is the real secret. Judicial deliberation 
is overrated.”
The real reason for concern, then, may not be so 
much that open deliberation would lead to the loss of 
something valuable, but rather that it would introduce 
new pathologies. It is fascinating to ponder: what would 
happen if the Wisconsin Supreme Court, or any Ameri-
can appellate court, held its deliberations in public? The 
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result might actually be more, rather than less, dialogue, 
though whether it would be worthy of the name “delib-
eration” is another matter. A justice may feel compelled 
to limit his contribution to a prepared statement, rather 
than to engage in a free-flowing, substantive debate.
At the same time, public deliberation would better 
enable interest groups to monitor behavior, creating 
the very real potential for reduced independence and a 
decreased willingness to back off positions once taken. 
Advocates might also pay close attention, and could 
seek to use statements from deliberations as tools of 
argumentation, suggesting that they somehow shed 
light on the “true” meaning of an opinion. Courts 
would, in turn, have to grapple with whether to allow 
such arguments, which would raise many of the same 
general issues as were featured in debates over the 
precedential value of unpublished opinions. While it 
would strike many as inappropriate to bar advocates 
from citing statements made in open deliberation, 
allowing such citation would arguably create incentives 
for judges to behave strategically by attempting to stack 
the deliberative record with statements favoring their 
preferred perspective.
One might conclude that these effects are real but 
worthwhile. Open deliberations would certainly provide 
the interested public with a window into a process that 
has been off limits, and what it saw through that window 
might enhance its faith in the rule of law. The examples 
of Brazil and England suggest that the consequences 
of open deliberations are not inevitably bad, though 
context matters, and both legal systems are quite dif-
ferent from our own. Wisconsin may not have provided 
us with an opportunity to test our intuitions, but it has 
given us a chance to reconsider a feature of our system 
that we would otherwise take for granted.
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